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Abstract: In this paper, we profile the behaviour and functionality of multiple recent variants of WannaCry and 
CrySiS/Dharma, through static and dynamic malware analysis. We then analyse and detail the commonly 
occurring behavioural features of ransomware. These features are utilised to develop a prototype Intrusion 
Detection and Prevention System (IDPS) named Talos, which comprises of several detection 
mechanisms/components. Benchmarking is later performed to test and validate the performance of the 
proposed Talos IDPS system and the results discussed in detail. It is established that the Talos system can 
successfully detect all ransomware variants tested, in an average of 1.7 seconds and instigate remedial action in 
a timely manner following first detection. The paper concludes with a summarisation of our main findings and 
discussion of potential future works which may be carried out to allow the effective detection and prevention of 
ransomware on systems and networks. 
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1.Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
In our previous paper (Wood & Eze, 2020), we examined the way in which ransomware interacts with the system 
on infection to implicate upon both data and system functionality. Our key finding was that it was possible to 
restore data and system functionality following ransomware infection. This paper iterates on our previous work 
(Wood & Eze, 2020) and explores the prospect of profiling the behaviour of ransomware and developing an 
Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS) system based exclusively on the commonly occurring system 
behaviours of ransomware. Section two provides an overview of ransomware in recent times, section three 
summarises previous research in this area, section four summarises our behavioural analysis of WannaCry and 
CrySiS/Dharma, section five outlines and details the proposed Talos system and its detection performance. 
Section six concludes the paper with a summary and discussion of this study’s main findings, before drawing the 
paper to a close with an overview of areas requiring further work to advance the state-of-the-art in IDPS 
technology.  
1.2 Relevant terminologies 
This paper refers to several acronyms and terminologies throughout, these are Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDS), Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS) and Ransomware. 
Firstly, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) automate the process of manual intrusion detection processes by 
monitoring networks and systems for malicious/suspicious activity in violation of established security policies. If 
activity is identified, activity is logged and alerts sent to administrators (Azhagiri et al, 2015). Comparatively, 
Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) share the same capability of an IDS but additionally respond to and take 
remedial action when malicious activity is identified, before notifying administrators of the activity detected and 
remedial action taken (Azhagiri et al, 2015). An Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS) as the name 
implies combines the capabilities of both IDS and IPS to formulate a more robust system. Ransomware refers to 
a type of malicious software which is designed to restrict access to a computer system and its data until such a 
time a monetary fee is paid.  
2. Background  
As technology evolves to become more advanced and sophisticated, so have the attackers, who are continually 
designing and developing ever more destructive and imaginative means of breaching network and system 
security. As society, the economy and critical infrastructure, increasingly depend upon information technology 
(IT), cyberattacks are becoming increasingly attractive to attackers with potentially disastrous consequences 
(Jang-Jaccard & Nepal, 2014). The COVID pandemic has exacerbated the growing issue of malware/ransomware 
attacks, due to organisations swiftly adapting business infrastructures, which has left multiple loopholes within 
 
 
IT systems, presenting attackers with easy opportunities for exploitation (Check Point, 2020). As of Q3 2020, a 
50% average daily increase of attacks globally was observed, compared to the first half of 2020, specifically, the 
USA saw a 98.1% increase, India a 39.2% increase, Sri Lanka a 43.6% increase, Russia a 57.9% increase and 
Turkey a 32.5% increase (Check Point, 2020). Furthermore, 90% of security professionals report growing volumes 
of cyberattacks over the previous 12 months in 2020, with 4/5 reporting attacks are growing more sophisticated 
than 2019 (Bannister, 2020).  
 
Ransomware remains a prevalent cybersecurity threat, capable of causing serious disruption globally. In 2017, 
the WannaCry ransomware affected the United Kingdom’s NHS and spread rapidly across NHS networks, causing 
unprecedented disruption and resulting in an inability to provide patient care, with 34 trusts locked out of 
devices, and 46 reporting interruption (Smart, 2018). This incurred costs of £92,000,000 and resulted in 19,000 
appointments being cancelled (Goud, 2018).  
 
Petya, also caused substantial disruption in 2017. Merck Pharmaceuticals experienced disruption to research, 
manufacture, and product sales, amounting to damages of $670,000,000 (Davis, 2017). Whilst shipping 
companies, Maersk and TNT suffered substantial interference to operations and incurred nine figure costs 
(Greenberg, 2018). To recover, Maersk needed to reinstall 4000 servers, 45,000 systems and 2,500 applications 
over a 10-day recovery operation, which Maersk warns could incur losses amounting to $300 million due to 
severe disruption (Osborne, 2018).  
 
Another variant, CrySiS/Dharma, has become increasingly active recently, with activity increasing 148% from 
February to April 2019 (Arntz, 2019). Throughout 2018, new CrySiS/Dharma variants were discovered from 
January to August 2018 with further increases from September to November 2018 (Coveware, 2018). If payment 
is made, chances of decryption range from 25% to 100%, due to some variants being more sophisticated than 
others (Coveware, 2018). Evidence suggests CrySiS/Dharma is becoming more sophisticated with perpetrators 
quashing issues which allowed decryption without payment (Nadeeau, 2018), suggesting active interest in 
developing increasingly destructive ransomware.   
3. Previous Work  
Previous studies have explored the prospect of building an IDPS for the detection and prevention of 
ransomware. Firstly, Azer & El-Kosiary (2018), proposed an IDPS model for detecting network intrusions and 
ransomware, which builds upon the concept of honeypots. Multiple decoy files are placed on the system in areas 
not ordinarily accessed by legitimate users, decoy files are then monitored for any access attempts. The 
proposed IDPS model is tested in its ability to detect a variety of ransomware types such as Cryptowall, Kovter, 
Winlock, Cryptolocker, Filecoder and Reveton. Samples of each ransomware are then executed on a system 
monitored by the IDPS model. This model detected all variants with the slowest detection time being Filecoder 
at 25 seconds, whilst the fastest was Cryptolocker at 15 seconds (Azer & El-Kosiary, 2018). The model is also 
capable of detecting attacker intrusions, using techniques such as decoy tokens, decoy servers, decoy partitions 
and decoy shared folders. The model upon testing, could detect all attacker intrusions, with the slowest 
detection time being 13 minutes whilst the fastest was 5 minutes (Azer & El-Kosiary, 2018). Evidently, whilst the 
system could detect all intrusions and ransomware, its detection times varied, meaning intrusions and 
ransomware threats are left momentarily uninterrupted, which is undesirable, hence further work is required to 
reduce detection times.  
  
Celdrán et al (2019) developed a system intended to detect and prevent ransomware from spreading within 
Integrated Clinical Environments (ICE). The system utilises machine-learning (ML) techniques to detect and 
classify the propagation phase of ransomware attacks, whilst Network Function Visualisation (NFV) and Software 
Defined Network (SDN) paradigms are implemented to prevent ransomware from spreading by isolating and 
replacing infected network devices. Celdrán et al (2019) performed tests which showed the system can detect 
ransomware such as WannaCry, BadRabbit, Petya and PowerGhost. This is achieved by performing anomaly 
detection using techniques such as One-class Support Vector Machine (OC-SVM), Local Outlier Factor (LOF) and 
Isolation Forest (IF), whilst techniques such as; Neural Networks (NN), Naïve Bayes (NB) and Random Forest (RF) 
are used for classification (Celdrán et al, 2019). Tests are performed for each technique, with OC-SVM proving 
most effective for initial attack detection with 92.32% precision and 99.97% recall, whilst NB was most effective 
in botnet attack classification with 99.99% accuracy within 0.22 seconds (Celdrán et al, 2019). 
 
 
4. Ransomware analysis  
4.1 Ransomware sample acquisition  
To allow development of Talos, common ransomware behaviours needed to be ascertained. To achieve this, 
several recent strains of WannaCry and CrySiS/Dharma are selected and acquired from www.virusshare.com to 
allow hybrid static/dynamic analysis (Table 1). Samples are populated onto a VMWare workstation virtual 
machine (VM) running Windows 7 SP1 for analysis. 
  
Table 1: Acquired WannaCry and CrySiS/Dharma samples. 
  
Family Sample No SHA-256 Hash 










4.2 WannaCry analysis 
With reference to our previous study (Wood & Eze, 2020), it was established the first WannaCry sample when 
executed would create several files within its working directory ( 
Figure 1), before creating encrypted duplicates of files prior to erasing the originals (Figure 2). It then creates 
several files in directories where files are encrypted, before presenting a user interface (UI) which demands a 
















Figure 3: WannaCry user interface and sample decryption interface 
 
Our previous study also indicated the Windows registry is modified to define a working directory for WannaCry ( 
 
Figure 4), and to set the executable ‘tasksche.exe’ to run automatically ( 
Figure 5). A wallpaper is also set and enforced, notably both files originate from the defined working directory. 
The referenced “tasksche.exe” executable however did not exist in the first sample, although it is observed as a 












Figure 5: “tasksche.exe” set to run from working directory 
 
To assess the effects on data, the encryption behaviour of the WannaCry samples was monitored with 
FolderChangesView. This indicates files are not encrypted directly, but rather encrypted duplicates of files 
created before the originals are deleted. This behaviour is shown with the file “ffc.pdf” where an encrypted 
duplicate is firstly created before the original is erased (Figure 6), indicating files are recoverable following 
alleged encryption as established in our previous paper (Wood & Eze, 2020). 
 





Figure 6: Encrypted duplicate of “ffc.pdf” created and original later deleted 
 
Regarding files/data, static analysis with PEiD indicated WannaCry modifies file access permissions by processing 
the icacls command (Figure 7). If utilised within the C:\ directory, every user would have access to all files (Plett 





Figure 7: References to icacls 
 
The second sample revealed notable network activity, specifically FakeNet-NG indicated the sample during 
execution attempts to connect to a unknown domain (Figure 8). Which, Newman (2017) argues, acts as a kill 
switch. Furthermore, ARP protocol traffic is observable during analysis with Wireshark (Figure 9), this behaviour 
is exhibited by all samples except for the first, analysis revealed such behaviour exists to find other potentially 









Figure 9: ARP activity from WannaCry observed within Wireshark 
 
Further static analysis of the first sample was carried out with Strings. This revealed references to 3 specific 
directories and 177 filetypes (Figure 10). Analysis indicated; these are the filetypes that WannaCry encrypts 







Figure 10: Filetypes and directories referenced within first WannaCry sample 
4.3 CrySiS/Dharma analysis 
CrySiS/Dharma was also analysed, which upon execution will request administrator privileges, if granted, this 
results in immediate encryption of network drives (Figure 11), before data with the “C:\” directory and its 
subdirectories are encrypted (Figure 12). All variants create the “FILES ENCRYPTED.txt” file, containing a 
ransom/instruction note with alternating contact addresses in multiple locations. Finally, an interface is 












Figure 13: CrySiS/Dharma user interface 
 
Much like WannaCry, FolderChangesView revealed, original files are copied into encrypted duplicates before the 
originals are modified and deleted (Figure 14). Thus, files are not encrypted directly and hence recoverable, as 
explored during our last paper (Wood & Eze, 2020). FolderChangesView further revealed CrySiS/Dharma will 
duplicate its payload into directories not normally accessed by the user on the system such as “AppData” and 
“System32” (Figure 15). RegShot revealed registry keys referencing such payloads to allow automatic execution ( 








Figure 15: Payload duplicated into discreet directories 
 
 




Notably, “Info.hta” is created across all samples within the same directory as the duplicated payload and the 
registry modified to automatically execute this file with “mshta.exe” as indicated by RegShot (Figure 17). 
Analysis of “Info.hta” with the Strings tool revealed it to contain a series of HTML and JavaScript code (Figure 
18). Further static analysis of the samples with Immunity Debugger revealled references to WebDav in the form 
of “davcint” ( 
Figure 19), a tool to establish and manage secure connections to remote WebDav servers (Microsoft, 2019). This 












Figure 19: References to WebDav observed within CrySiS/Dharma 
5.Proposed Talos IDPS system 
5.1 Introduction 
In this section of the paper, we present the prototype Talos IDPS system and discuss some of the ransomware 
behavioural features selected from the earlier ransomware analysis and components which have been 
developed to construct Talos. The naming of the Talos prototype system, is taken from Greek mythology and is 
named after the giant automaton who defended Europa in Crete from pirates and invaders by circling the island 
three times daily and hurling boulders at approaching enemy ships.   
5.2 Common features of ransomware 
After ascertaining the common behaviours of the ransomware samples, it was evident, many indicators of a 
ransomware infection manifested within the windows filesystem and as system processes. Thus, as a starting 
point for Talos, a selection of key filesystem features for both ransomware families are selected (Table 2). 
Notably, other behaviours, specifically file integrity issues may be generalisable to other ransomware variants, 
this aspect however will be explored as part of our future work.  
 
Table 2: WannaCry and CrySiS/Dharma sample common features 
   
WannaCry  File Types .wnry .wncryt .wncry 
Processes tasksche.exe taskse.exe taskdl.exe 
Created Files C:\Users\User\Desktop\@WanaDecryptor@.bmp C:\@Please_Read_Me@.txt 
C:\Users\User\Desktop\@WanaDecryptor@.exe C:\@WanaDecryptor@.exe 
C:\Users\User\Desktop\@Please_Read_Me@.txt C:\Windows\tasksche.exe 
CrySiS/Dharma  File Types .combo .HARMA .PLEX .2020 .aa1 
Processes mshta.exe 
Created Files C:\Users\User\Desktop\FILES ENCRYPTED.txt C:\Windows\System32\Info.hta 





5.3 Talos Prototype components 
Considering information ascertained during analysis, and to allow development of Talos, it was determined 
several key components would be required, which included a main component, a file integrity check, a filetype 
check, a blacklisted file check, process check and reset/initialisation components. Each component was created 
in Python, the functions of each are explained in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Descriptions of each component of Talos  
 
Component  Description  
Main The main component sequentially calls and executes each component and interprets the output of each i.e., 
status codes and takes remedial action where required. This is achieved by a function known as the “watcher” 
and the use of a centralised concern level variable, which is raised in the event activity is detected. If the 
variable raises to 1, the function disables all network adapters to prevent ransomware propagation, whereas 
if raising to 2 or above, the main component ensures all network adapters are disabled and the system is 
safely shut down to eliminate the risk of further damage. The main component will also call the initialisation 
and reset components if honey file integrity is reported as damaged by the “File Integrity Check” component.   
Initialisation The initialisation component, when called, generates multiple “.txt” honey files across various system 
directories, where ransomware activity is known to occur, such as the; “C:\”, user’s directory amongst other 
strategic locations. Such files contain a series of ASCII characters and digits of randomised lengths, to evade 
detection by malicious software. Upon generation, SHA256 and the paths/locations for each file are saved, to 




Ransomware commonly affects file integrity, either through deletion or modification. This component verifies 
file integrity by gathering a list of files generated earlier by the initialisation component and their SHA256 
hashes, it then generates new SHA256 hash for each of the files and compares them against the earlier 
generated SHA256 hashes. If these hashes match, then no file integrity issues have occurred, whereas if it 
does not match or files no longer exist, this strongly indicates file integrity is impacted, in this instance the 
component will raise a status code for remediation by the main component.  
Filetype 
Check 
This component examines defined directories for filetypes associated with ransomware, to achieve this, a list 
of files within each directory is gathered, and checks performed to verify if any end with a defined 
ransomware extension. If found, file details are logged and a status code raised, to allow later remediation. 
Process 
Check 
This component gathers a list of running system processes and checks this list to establish if it contains the 
name of an associated ransomware process loaded from a file. If a process is found to be running, the 
component will generate a log and raise an alarm for interpretation by the main component.  
Blacklisted 
File Check 
During execution, ransomware creates multiple files in various locations across the system, containing 
payloads or other required data. This component examines various defined directories for the presence of 
such files. If files are found, the component raises an alarm for remediation by the main component. 
Reset If the file integrity check reports that a generated honey file is damaged, then the reset component is called 
by the main component to erase all previously generated files before the initialisation component is called to 
generate a new selection of honey files for further integrity checks to be performed.  
5.4 Data 
One of Talos’s key features is the consideration of known ransomware behaviours to detect activity, to permit 
this, data on ransomware behaviour is stored within files. This data includes the list of files/hashes generated by 
the initialisation component, the processes, files and filetypes associated with ransomware and the resulting 
status codes of each Talos component amongst other data. Each data item is stored within XML tags (Figure 20), 
which is later retrieved through regular expression parsing by each component. This method of storing and 
retrieving data, and the modularity of Talos will permit later adaptation of the system to allow the detection of 




Figure 20: Two example of files from where components will read data from 
 
 
5.5 Prototype system 
Upon compiling data on common ransomware behaviours and establishing the required detection mechanisms, 
all required components of Talos could be developed. Once the system was built; it could then be executed as a 
console application (Figure 21). Talos executes each component sequentially as part of the main loop and 
interprets the results at each stage for action to be taken where necessary. If a component detects a single 
event, then a centralised “concernlevel” variable is incremented by “1”, whereas if a component reports 
multiple events, it is set to “2”. A function known as the “watcher” will check the value of this variable after 
executing each component, if it reaches “1”, all network adapters are disabled to minimise the spread of 
ransomware, whereas if greater than or equal to “2”, all network adapters are disabled and the system safely 








Figure 22: The “watcher” function (source code) 
 
In addition to performing remedial action, each component of Talos will create respective logs of the detected 
activity, for example the File Integrity check component, will record details of the activity detected, the expected 
and generated SHA256 hashes and additionally details of the current user, IP address, running processes and 
listening network services (Figure 23). All of which are collected for examination at a later point in time to 




Figure 23: Example of log file generated by the File Integrity Check component 
 
 
5.6 Talos Prototype performance benchmarking 
After building the prototype and verifying its functionality, benchmarking was performed to measure the 
systems detection and response times to threats, specifically the earlier analysed WannaCry and CrySiS/Dharma 
samples. To perform benchmarking, a testing script was prepared, which; executes each ransomware sample, 
launches Talos and records the execution times of each. Benchmarking results indicated Talos could detect all 
variants of WannaCry and CrySiS/Dharma promptly (Table 4), with an average first detection time of 2 seconds 
for WannaCry and 1.6 seconds for CrySiS/Dharma, resulting in an average first detection time of 1.7 seconds. 
Results also indicate Talos can initiate remedial action within a reasonable timeframe with CrySiS/Dharma, 
although there is evidently a need to reduce these times with WannaCry. 
 





Sample Execution Time First Detection NWAD SPO 
1 11:54:37 11:54:38 11:54:47 11:54:48 
2 12:03:01 12:03:04 12:03:12 12:03:20 
3 11:43:59 11:44:01 11:44:09 11:44:10 




1 12:17:09 12:17:11 12:17:13 12:17:13 
2 12:27:01 12:27:03 12:27:05 12:27:05 
3 12:34:10 12:34:12 12:34:14 12:34:14 
4 12:40:03 12:40:04 12:40:07 12:40:07 
5 12:56:23 12:56:24 12:56:25 12:56:29 
 
Notably across all CrySiS/Dharma variants with the exception of sample 5, the network adaptor disable (NWAD) 
and system power off (SPO) trigger times are identical, this occurred due to the file integrity check component 
detecting multiple incidents i.e. a file being modified and another deleted. Which immediately sets the 
components status code to a higher level, resulting in the main component setting the “concernlevel” variable to 
“2”, which results in the “watcher” function calling both the NWAD and SPO functions.  
 
Benchmarking further revealed performance disparity between individual components, namely, the file integrity 
component proved most effective at detecting CrySiS/Dharma, whilst the blacklisted file check proved most 
effective at detecting WannaCry, made evident by the first detection order ( 
 
Table 5). Where no result is recorded, Talos initiated remedial action before components detected activity. The 
ransomware associated filetype check proved least effective and only detected 1 WannaCry variant during 
testing. The performance disparity between each component is notable, as this indicates individual component 
performance is intrinsically linked to individual ransomware/malware behaviour, which suggests individual 
components may prove more effective at detecting one variant over another. This finding may have potential 
ramifications if Talos is later adapted to account for other variants, and further suggests, combining multiple 
components may be required. 
 
Table 5: Individual component detection when tested against WannaCry and CrySiS/Dharma variants 
 









1 3  1 2 
2  1 2 3 
3 3  1 2 




1 1    
2 1    
3 1    
4 1    
5 1  2  
 
 
6.Conclusions and future work 
6.1 Study summary 
In this study, the behaviour of multiple ransomware variants was profiled using static/dynamic analysis and later 
analysed to develop detection mechanisms for Talos, specifically focusing on filesystem activity. The system 
developed in this study, has shown an IDPS utilising the common behavioural features of ransomware/malware 
can prove highly beneficial in the active detection and mitigation of ransomware. The Talos system could detect 
all ransomware variants tested promptly, averaging 1.7 seconds for first detection.  
 
Results achieved during performance benchmarking of Talos are promising, and represent an improvement over 
other comparable works, such as Azer & El-Kosairy’s (2018) study, where the detection time ranged from 15 
seconds for Cryptolocker to 25 seconds for filecoder. Notably, Talos and the work of Azer & El-Kosairy (2018) are 
designed to detect different malware/ransomware types with the work of Azer & El-Kosairy’s (2018) able to 
detect other attack and intrusion types. Furthermore, Talos falls behind systems incorporating artificial 
intelligence-based techniques, such as the work of Celdrán et al (2019) where the classification time was quicker 
at 0.22 seconds. Consequently, further performance benchmarking and iteration of Talos is required to fully 
assess its performance against comparable systems. However, Talos is modular and may be later adapted to 
account for further malware/ransomware variants and other attack/intrusion types. 
6.2 Future Work  
Whilst Talos offers a promising level of performance, there are areas which require further development to 
improve the accuracy and resiliency of the system. Firstly, Talos is at present designed and tested to detect 
several strains of CrySiS/Dharma and WannaCry, which constrains the system’s ability to detect other 
ransomware/malware variants and other intrusive/malicious activity. Thus, more complex network propagating 
ransomwares such as Petya (Wood & Eze, 2020) and other forms of attacks/intrusions are not yet detected by 
Talos. Furthermore, the current approach taken with Talos, assumes that other security mechanisms such as 
firewalls and antivirus products have failed to contain threats to the point where ransomware/malware can 
attain a foothold on the system. To address these area, Talos will be further developed in our future work to 
incorporate the common behavioural characteristics of other intrusive activities and ransomware/malware 
variants and also to consider activity occurring on the wider network and filesystem as part of a hybrid host-
based and network-based system. This will help to allow the earlier detection of threats and will drastically 
improve the detection capability of Talos, allowing it to detect a diverse range of attacks. 
 
Whilst this study has specifically focused on CrySiS/Dharma and WannaCry behaviours, it is believed the 
behaviours uncovered may be generalised to other forms of ransomware i.e., the way in which ransomware 
creates encrypted duplicates of files before affecting the integrity of the originals. Other features, such as file 
creation, filetypes and process spawning may be generalisable to other variants, the system will however require 
further adaptation and testing further to account for this, this aspect will be addressed in our future work.  
 
Another area requiring further develop is Talos’s decision-making capabilities, present Talos performs two 
remedial actions in sequence, firstly disabling network adapters if one event is detected and secondly powering 
off the system if two or more events are detected. The aim of this is to prevent ransomware spreading to other 
systems and to prevent further damage to the system and data. This approach however is potentially 
problematic in the event of false-positive errors, where legitimate activity is erroneously perceived as malicious. 
This area is acknowledged as a problem, and will be addressed in our future work, to achieve this Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) will be implemented into Talos, to allow it make more informed decisions about the actions its 
takes by considering the characteristics of previously detected threats to determine how best to respond. AI and 
Machine-learning based techniques have received considerable interest in the wider-research community, 
Celdrán et al (2019) applied machine learning techniques to their proposed system and saw promising detection 
accuracy scores and classification times. William (2020) argues, AI-based IDS unlike traditional IDS, have 
capability to learn over time from previous attacks to allow creation of new detection algorithms, allowing it to 
learn how to stop stealthy adversaries. Our future work will aim to address these areas, to allow Talos to 
perform more effectively. 
 
Whilst the performance of Talos is evidently promising, based upon the results of our own performance tests. It 
is acknowledged that Talos is a work in progress the rates of false-positives and false-negatives is not yet 
 
 
ascertained. At the present point of development, it is acknowledged that Talos could potentially perceive 
legitimate/benign activity as malicious and actively block it, or could fail to detect other forms of ransomware, 
outside of those analysed as part of this study, resulting in false-positive and false-negative errors. Our future 
work will measure these rates by simulating multiple benign and malicious activities on the system and recording 
the response of Talos to ascertain the true false-positive and false-negative error rates.  
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